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RONALD M. GOULD* 
A Student’s Tribute to Professor 
Arthur Miller 
 offer this tribute to my former teacher, Professor Arthur Miller, 
commending his teaching, scholarship, and contributions to the 
American legal system.  My deep admiration for Professor Miller is 
based on my experiences as a student, a practicing lawyer, and a 
judge.1 
I started at the University of Michigan Law School in the summer 
of 1970.  Professor Miller was the teacher for my opening and basic 
Civil Procedure class.  On the opening day of class I went to a large 
classroom that must have had more than 100 students in it.  In walked 
Professor Miller in a three-piece suit with a total command of the 
atmosphere in the class.  I wasn’t sure then what a lawyer or law 
professor looked like, but surely this was it.  From the start he asked 
students tough and demanding questions.  This was a few years before 
The Paper Chase portrayal of a fictional Professor Charles 
Kingsfield’s demanding inquiries of students made the Socratic 
method more familiar in public consciousness, but we had the real 
thing. 
Under Professor Miller’s guidance, we started to learn to think like 
lawyers.  Before long we were enjoying the tasks of spotting issues, 
identifying potentially governing legal rules, debating their 
application, and coming to a sensible conclusion.  I recall, for 
example, our class talking about the personal jurisdiction 
requirements of International Shoe: What were the “minimum 
contacts” necessary to sustain jurisdiction?  What did it mean for such 
exercise of jurisdiction to be consistent with “fair play” and 
 
* Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
1 I write in a personal capacity, and not on behalf of the court on which I serve. 
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“substantial justice?”  Soon, too, we were exploring the contours of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Under Rule 8, the niceties and 
potential pitfalls of detailed pleading were a thing of the past; instead, 
only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief” was required.  If a party made a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, we learned we 
were to look to the nature of the facts pleaded in the complaint, and to 
consider if a claim was stated assuming that the plaintiff could prove 
these facts were true.  When were any counterclaims mandatory and 
when permissive?  Rule 13 covered that.  When could third persons 
be brought into a lawsuit, for example to indemnify the defendant?  
Rule 14 gave guidance on that.  If a pleading was deficient, we 
absorbed the governing standard for amendment under Rule 15, that 
the “court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”  
Discovery in those days was governed by the standard of Rule 26, 
which before today’s preoccupation with “required disclosures,” had 
an extremely broad relevance standard.  Next, assuming that the case 
had proceeded past initial pleadings, perhaps with the benefit of some 
discovery, we pondered the critical summary judgment standard: 
when was there, in the language of then-applicable Rule 56, a 
“genuine issue of material fact?”  What if a judgment had been 
reached but there was an apparent mistake, when could there be relief 
from the judgment?  Rule 60 established standards for relief and when 
something could be done about it. 
As we explored such questions, Professor Miller’s long experience 
and searching inquiries made us realize that the law was not a prize to 
be easily won.  We would have to work hard and think critically to 
understand these lessons and to help clients find their way in 
litigation. 
Many professors used Socratic dialogue, but Professor Miller was 
one of the best.  When we were called upon in class, we knew that our 
thought process and reasoning would be carefully tested.  We learned 
early in the year that the first and foremost need was to be well 
prepared each day for class.  Professor Miller seemed to call on 
students randomly, asking them to state the case under review and 
help us with its lessons.  In one of the first days of class, Professor 
Miller called on a particular student and asked him to comment about 
the case being studied that day.  This unfortunate student tried to 
“pass” as unprepared.  Arthur Miller would have none of that.  He 
folded up his papers, thundered that he was not going to waste his 
time or the class’s time talking to a student who was not prepared, and 
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strode briskly out of the classroom, telling us that it was important for 
each student to do their part in preparation.  After that, few of us 
would risk coming to class without having studied the assigned cases 
for the day.  A possibly apocryphal anecdote made the rounds in our 
classroom: The story was that during a class a year or two earlier, 
after Professor Miller had taken some procedural issue to its limit, he 
tore open his suit and shirt and revealed a Superman costume.  
Whether or not that had occurred, we knew that it was just as unwise 
to step on Superman’s cape as to come to Professor Miller’s class 
unprepared or to try to bluff your way through a case discussion.  I 
don’t believe that Professor Miller had a Superman costume under his 
shirt every day, but he certainly seemed to have the mental 
superpowers that went with command of the civil procedure territory. 
But let’s say you had studied the cases, had thought about them 
hard, had some ideas about the law, and were ready to state them.  
Voicing your opinions in class to Professor Miller was just the 
beginning.  He had a nice way of asking question after question, fairly 
criticizing your arguments and piercing to the core of what you knew 
and what you did not know.  I suppose that’s what got Socrates in 
trouble in ancient Athens, but in twentieth-century Ann Arbor this 
was part of the process by which we improved and deepened our legal 
analysis.  After such a session with Professor Miller, you understood 
that this type of study required harder thought and deeper thinking 
than the typical undergraduate fare.  If you were going to think like a 
lawyer and advocate for a client, you had to recognize that there 
would be another person on the other side of the case, likely as smart 
as you, and certainly as highly motivated.  You couldn’t just dance 
through the issues casually; you had to be able to defend your 
arguments.  Through classes like these our minds were stretched, we 
started to think like lawyers, we understood the difficulties inherent in 
even apparently straightforward cases, and we knew that doing our 
preparation with diligence, coming to conclusions, and testing them 
against hard questions would advance our skills.  In all of this, 
Professor Miller was a master teacher. 
After law school it was my very good fortune to serve as a law 
clerk to the Honorable Wade H. McCree, Jr. on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and thereafter to be a law clerk for 
Justice Potter Stewart on the Supreme Court of the United States.  I 
wasn’t surprised that each of these jurists, when discussing any civil 
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procedure question, might ask to see what Professor Miller’s treatise, 
Wright & Miller,2 had to say on the subject. 
After clerking I joined the law firm Perkins Coie in Seattle and 
became a litigation department associate in late 1975.  This work 
constantly brought me back in touch with Professor Miller’s leading 
treatise on civil procedure.  In early 1976, I was called in and asked to 
argue a motion.  I was the new guy on the block, but in those days 
litigation associates at the firm got responsibility quickly.  One of the 
firm’s clients had been sued in a county in central Washington, and 
the litigation partner and the senior associate on the case had 
developed a procedural argument that they hoped would get our client 
dismissed from the case.  I’m sure other law firm associates at times 
have encountered this setting: The battle lines were drawn and I was 
asked to fly to the remote town, go to the county courthouse, and try 
to get our client out of the lawsuit.  This case concerned a state court 
procedure, but the state court’s rules of civil procedure were much the 
same as the federal rules.  Although I had no practical experience, and 
knew that the other lawyers had handled many cases, I did have the 
sense that I understood, however imperfectly, the big picture of what 
these civil rules were trying to accomplish.  I told the partner and 
senior associate involved that I was honored to have the chance to 
advocate for our client, but I thought I should say that the theory of 
the case on the applicable procedural rule seemed wrong to me, and I 
thought that the court would adopt an analysis along lines I described, 
which were probably parroted from what I remembered of Professor 
Miller’s class.  The partner acknowledged my position, asked me to 
“do my best,” and the next morning off I went. 
Law practice was cordial in those days in Washington, and when I 
landed my opposing counsel was there in his pickup truck to meet me 
at the airport.  I am sure I was wearing a three-piece suit, trying to 
model myself after Professor Miller’s New York law practice style.  
But my opponent was a country lawyer, complete with cowboy boots, 
a string tie, and a wide-brimmed hat.  He drove us to the county 
courthouse where instead of arguing in the courtroom we were invited 
to come into the judge’s chambers for discussion.  The judge said he 
would let us argue this formally in the courtroom if we preferred, but 
he would be just as happy to chat in chambers.  This was an offer not 
 
2 The current version of Professor Miller’s treatise, a collaborative effort with Professor 
Wright and other distinguished scholars, is known as CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR 
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2008).  It has long been a staple 
of almost every law office, law library, and judicial chambers. 
GOULD TRIBUTE 3/7/2012  1:56 PM 
2012] A Student’s Tribute to Professor Arthur Miller 927 
to be refused.  I was the moving party and went through my advocacy 
statement as well as I could, the other lawyer responded, and the 
judge paused for a few minutes, took a book or two off the shelf, and 
thought about the case for some time.  Then he spoke, and there was 
something familiar about the substance: He stated the law much as I 
would have expected Professor Miller to state it.  His analysis was 
right down the middle of the fairway in terms of how Arthur Miller’s 
treatise analyzed this rule.  I went back to my law firm in Seattle with 
a loss.  I didn’t think anyone really had expected that I would win that 
motion.  I suppose that we were just giving it a good advocate’s try 
for the client.  But I also think that more than one person noticed that 
the language of the judge’s order was similar to the analysis I had 
thought would be adopted, which in turn was simply what I thought 
Professor Miller would have said.  For years after that, and my 
litigation practice extended from 1975 until the end of 1999, when the 
rules of civil procedure came into issue, I just tried to analyze them in 
the way I learned in Arthur Miller’s classroom and things worked out 
well. 
Whenever a procedural issue arose in my law practice, Wright & 
Miller was a starting point.  Not surprisingly to those familiar with 
Professor Miller’s class, on a great many cases I also started off with 
a good command of the true issues, a feeling for how the rules work 
together, and an understanding of the verbal issues presented in each 
of the key rules.  Professor Miller had indeed taught me to think like a 
lawyer.  My experience in law practice improved on, but did not alter, 
the basic pattern that he and his colleagues at the law school had 
instilled in my approach to law. 
I maintained my admiration for the work of Professor Miller once, 
courtesy of President Clinton and the U.S. Senate, I got to be a judge.  
Most appeals that come before us involve substantive issues of law, 
not rules of civil procedure.  But whenever there was an issue about 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, my first question was, what 
does Wright & Miller say?  The evenhanded way in which Professor 
Miller’s treatise assesses tough issues gives a good model for aspiring 
judges: Identify the rules of law that have been clearly established, 
discuss the leading precedents, analyze the language of the rules and 
the issues they present, assess the underlying policy impacts of 
differing interpretations, identify the weight of authority, and know 
why it goes that way. 
My admiration for Professor Arthur Miller builds upon my 
experience as a student at law school, as a litigator in a commercial 
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litigation practice applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
as a judge happy to have the benefit of his scholarship.  I know that 
Professor Miller has made many other contributions to our country 
and its legal system, not the least of which are the important books 
that he has written on difficult legal subjects, exposing cutting-edge 
legal issues to his deep and insightful analysis,3 and his moderating of 
a popular television show which took methods of legal thinking to the 
general public on important issues.4  But if I ask myself what can be 
said that is true and simple about Professor Miller’s contributions to 
our country’s legal system, it takes me back to the classroom setting 
in which I first met him.  I can hear him explaining and asking 
questions about the principles in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: How do these rules operate individually and in 
combination?  What are the key phrases within them subject to 
interpretation?  What are the arguments pro and con one could expect 
for any interpretation?  How should the law governing these rules be 
best stated?  Professor Miller on subjects such as these is always clear 
in analysis, fair in evaluation, and precise in statement. 
Scholars like Professor Miller work in combination with lawyer 
advocates and judges in a cumulative process that can improve the 
legal system.  The practice of civil procedure in the courts of the 
United States has been elevated by Professor Miller’s work, his 
trenchant analysis has made its mark on our perceptions, and our 
ability to understand the law and apply it has been enhanced by his 
efforts. 
 
 
3 See, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA 
BANKS, AND DOSSIERS (1971), which presciently warned of coming dangers. 
4 I recall watching Professor Miller hold forth in his popular television show known as 
Miller’s Court.  I always thought of it as “King Arthur’s Court.”  Professor Miller could 
deploy his Socratic methods of questioning not only with first-year law students, but also 
with political figures, other scholars, and those who studied the keenest public policy 
issues. 
